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Abstract:
For several centuries, Japanese scholars have argued that their nation’s
culture—including its language, religion and ways of thinking—is somehow unique.
The darker side of this rhetoric, sometimes known by the English term
“Japanism” (nihon-jinron), played no small role in the nationalist fervor of the
early late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. While much of the so-called
“ideology of Japanese uniqueness” can be dismissed, in terms of the Japanese
approach to “religion,” there may be something to it. This paper highlights some
distinctive—if not entirely unique—features of the way religion has been
categorized and understood in Japanese tradition, contrasting these with Western
(i.e., Abrahamic), and to a lesser extent Indian and Chinese understandings.
Particular attention is given to the priority of praxis over belief in the Japanese
religious context.
Resumé : Des siècles durant, des chercheurs japonais ont soutenu que leur culture
– soit leur langue, leur religion et leurs façons de penser – était en quelque sorte
unique. Or, sous son jour le plus sombre, cette rhétorique, parfois désignée du
terme de « japonisme » (nihon-jinron), ne fut pas sans jouer un rôle déterminant
dans la montée de la ferveur nationaliste à la fin du XIXe siècle, ainsi qu’au début du
XXe siècle. Bien que l’on puisse discréditer pour l’essentiel cette soi-disant «
idéologie de l’unicité japonaise », la conception nippone de la « religion » constitue,
quant à elle, un objet d’analyse des plus utiles et pertinents. Cet article met en
évidence quelques caractéristiques, sinon uniques du moins distinctives, de la
manière dont la religion a été élaborée et comprise au sein de la tradition japonaise,
pour ensuite les constrater avec les conceptions occidentale (abrahamique) et, dans
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une moindre mesure, indienne et chinoise. Une attention toute particulière est ici
accordée à la praxis plutôt qu’à la croyance dans le contexte religieux japonais.
Keywords
Japanese religions, Shinto, belief, ritual, nihonjin-ron, orthopraxis
Mots clés

It is practice which makes it possible for one to attain one’s goals, whether those be defined as
liberation, awakening, harmony, prosperity, longevity, purification, or protection.
— Richard K. Payne, “The Ritual Culture of Japan,” p. 235

At the beginning of each my undergraduate courses in Asian religion, I employ the
classic definition of William James, for whom religion was: “the belief that there is an
unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves
thereto.” I have always believed this a good definition, because it is vague enough (using
“order” instead of God or gods, for example) to cover virtually all the major world religions. When we apply James’s definition to the case of Japanese religions, however,
things quickly become more complicated. This is not because Japanese religions lack
“gods” in some fashion (though the precise implications of the fundamental term kami
is still a matter of some dispute); rather, it is due to the fact that Japanese religions are,
arguably more than any other major religions in the world, literally “beyond belief.”
Let us begin with a look at the contemporary Japanese word for “religion,” which is
shūkyō 宗教. The two ideograms used here can be roughly translated as “sect” and “teachings”—indicating the distinctly sectarian nuance of the term. As a matter of fact, the term
shūkyō is a modern re-interpretation of an ancient but obscure term produced by Japanese
scholars in the Meiji period, just as Japan was “opening up” to Western culture and ideas.
(Shimazono 1998; Kisala 2006: 6–8). It is significant that this term was incorporated in
the context of an attempt by Meiji leaders to disassociate Shinto from Buddhism and disestablish the latter. Kisala also notes the role of the 1893 Parliament of Religions held in
Chicago in shaping the modern Japanese conception of religion (2006: 4-5). After the
Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), religion came to be understood, at least officially,
as characterized by “the presence of a individual founder and denominational organization” (Kisala 2006: 8) and, again, from the Meiji state’s point of view, as being private
and voluntary as opposed to public and obligatory. Interestingly, by effectively cutting off
some aspects of Shinto from the category of religion, the Meiji leaders were able to more
readily raise the status of Shinto as something beyond religion—the very essence of the
“national body” (kokutai 国体) itself. Although all of this officially ended with the end of
World War II and the Allied Occupation, the notion that religion is primarily “an internal
affair of individuals” was enshrined in the postwar Japanese government as part of the
1951 Religious Corporations Law (shūkyō hōjin hō 宗教法人法) designed initially to
protect religious freedom, but of late employed as a weapon against the encroaching
power of groups such as Soka Gakkai in the political sphere. (Dorman 1996)
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These facts have led some scholars to conclude, too readily, I think, that prior to its
contact with the West Japan did not have a concept of “religion” at all.1 It is certainly true
to say that before contact with the West Japan lacked a sense of religion that was
correlative to the way the term is understood in modern Western cultures and
languages—but this is merely to state the obvious. Furthermore, the same could be argued
about the West itself. After all, is it not the case that, prior to colonial expansion and
contact with foreign cultures, or, at any rate, prior to the dramatic and fateful encounter
with Islam in the Crusades, most ordinary Europeans also lacked a coherent concept of
“religion” other than its equivalence with Christian teaching? While it is true that a
few early Christian scholars (e.g., Lactantius, Augustine) sought to define religion as
“re-connection (L. re-ligare) with the divine,” this was hardly a matter of concern for
theologians prior to the Enlightenment. Despite a lack of attention to religion per se, there
is no doubt that Western Christians shared a general understanding of the basis of their or as they would have it - the religion. Belief was obviously fundamental to the Christian
faith. Indeed, the many conciliar disputes and proliferation of heresies show the centrality
of doctrine to the growing church. Of course, the Reformation showed that the precise
balance and relationship between faith and works had never been fully resolved, but even
the author of the Epistle of James and his Renaissance humanist heirs would hardly suggest that “works alone” were sufficient for a Christian life. And as much as Islam would
come to dispute the central tenets of Christian doctrine, Muslims would never suggest that
there was anything wrong with the Christian emphasis on belief. Indeed, the Arabic term
din refers to the “way” that Muslims should follow—a path firmly rooted in belief in the
oneness, power and goodness of Allah. While it is a practice, the practice is formed by and
founded on faith, rather than vice versa.2
In contrast to both Christianity and Islam (though perhaps closer to Judaism), Japanese
religious traditions are characterized by an emphasis on ritual and practice above belief or
doctrine, or even ethics as traditionally understood.3 Though this generalization may
apply more directly to the so-called indigenous tradition of Shinto, it also came to shape
the development of the various Japanese traditions of Buddhism, including Zen, Nichiren
and Pure Land.

Shinto: The Way of Kami
Let us begin with Shinto, which is often—though now controversially—considered the
indigenous religion of Japan. How is Shinto understood as a “religion”? What is the
Shinto term that best corresponds to the English word “religion”? Any investigation of
the meaning of Shinto has to start with the fundamental and inescapable term kami.4
Though this word, like all Japanese nouns, is graphically indicated by an ideogram—
神—it is important to recall that, with ancient Japanese terms such as this, the written form
is, even in its origins, a translation from the Chinese. Indeed, it is not too much to suggest
that the very meaning of kami was to some extent shaped by the Chinese nuance brought
into the word in the process of assigning it a graphic form (see Havens 2006: 19)5. A contemporary Japanese character dictionary gives the following senses for the character: god,
deity, mind, soul, venerable, hallowed. Most scholars agree that the latter terms on this list
more adequately grasp the earlier senses of kami: venerable, hallowed, awesome, sublime.
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Or, as I generally put it to my students, kami might be described as “that which makes you
go ‘wow!’” (Jp. sugoi!)
Given the extensive applicability and malleability of the term kami,6 it seems that there
is hardly a core term in any of the world’s religions that relies less upon a conceptual
understanding. This is not to say that kami is so mysterious or transcendent as to be
“beyond language”—as is sometimes claimed for the Chinese dao.7 Indeed, it may well
be the opposite: it is so simple that it does not warrant conceptual explanation or a metaphysical gloss. Indeed, it can be fairly said that kami is simply a felt presence of awe, and
as such can be found or manifest in anything: nature, of course, but also humans, animals,
mythical creatures, gods, and even man-made objects such as automobiles or trains.
At some level all this begins to sound suspiciously close to Rudolf Otto’s famous but
largely discredited notion of the mysterium tremendum that lies at the base of all religious
experience, and by extension at the foundation of all religion. The similarity here is a
superficial one, since Otto quite clearly frames his understanding of the numinous in terms
of “dread” and “majesty,” and insists on this fundamental “non-rational” element being
“mysterious”—akin in many respects to the unfathomable godhead of Protestant mystics.
While it is true that relations with kami—particular the wrathful aragami and
goryōshin8—can involve a measure of fear and trembling, Otto’s idea of the unique and
totaliter aliter aspects of the Holy seem to be worlds away from the very down to earth
and humble immanence of basic Shinto. In Shinto, it is precisely the nearness and conditionedness of kami that makes it so powerful; it is literally “within you”—if only for that
moment of overjoyed response. There is something decidedly concrete and material about
this form of religiosity, without it being simply materialistic.9
Also significant here is the aspect of feeling (Jp. kimochi) that underlies kami, which is
perhaps best considered as the relation between an external spirit or power and an internal
response to such.10 Or the relation might even be framed in reverse, such that it is the feeling
that gives rise to or realizes the external spiritual force. Given the radical immanence of kami,
and its lack of any sort of conceptual basis, it is easy to conclude that there is little room here
for belief or faith as it is normally understood in other world religions. Whether kami (conceived as spirits dwelling within nature or objects) really exist is entirely beside the point, for
the existence of kami rests upon the feeling that one has in encountering anything awesome.
At the same time, again, lest this become too much of a Western romantic notion—the
Wordsworthian sublime in the face of Nature—it is always important to note the significance of the community, and of ritual action, in Japanese religion more generally and
Shinto in particular.11 For it is normally within community rituals—matsuri or festivals
—that Shinto finds its expression. Indeed, in modern Japan it is tempting (though not
quite correct) to assume that these festivals are Shinto. The practice of festivals helps
to build not only relationships between members of a community, but also the connection
with the kami. Again, this could be understood as a way of cultivating an emotional or
responsive vocabulary which opens one up further to the kami-experience.12

Homology & Holography
The late Japanese scholar Kuroda Toshio became well-known in the 1980s and 1990s for
his work on the relation between Buddhism and Shinto in Japanese history, and for his
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influential but controversial conclusion that, in fact, to even speak of Shinto as if it were a
separate religion from Buddhism before the modern era is a mistake—albeit one that has
been made by scholars of all sorts for the past century or more. Kuroda argues that in fact
the construction of Shinto is largely an ideological one, developed initially to provide support for the Meiji government’s attempts to re-establish Shinto as the national religion of the
emerging Imperial state.13 At the heart of Kuroda’s thesis is the suggestion that the core of
Japanese religion as it has been practiced for at least a millennium is not the phantom Shinto
but rather a complex that he calls kenmitsu hōmon 顯蜜法門—roughly exoteric-esoteric
Buddhism, a combination of doctrines and practices that emerged out of the Tendai and
Shingon sects but which eventually came to undergird all forms of Buddhism, as well as
the loose “kami-cults” that according to Kuroda are mistakenly called “Shinto.”14
Whatever one thinks of the particulars of Kuroda’s thesis—and I, for one, have a number of problems with the way he frames the argument about the pre-modern non-existence
of Shinto as well as the way he conceives of kenmitsu Buddhism itself15—his emphasis on
a non-sectarian (largely esoteric) foundation for Japanese religiosity is highly persuasive,
and bucks the sectarianism of traditional religious scholarship in Japan, as well as the
commonly-held assumption that the so-called senju or single-path schools of the
Kamakura period overwhelmed the earlier esoteric traditions.16 Moreover, the particular
framework that Kuroda outlines, based on a highly symbolic and, more specifically,
homologic and holographic approach to the world makes a strong connection to recent
studies of Japanese ritual and festival.17
I am employing these terms here to indicate two related facets of Japanese religiosity.
Homology refers to the assertion of an identity between two things that goes beyond reference or simple analogy. As Payne puts it: “Mt Fuji does not stand for or represent anything”—it is simply sacred in the sense of “being a place of great power” (2006: 246).18
Holography refers more directly to the proactive element of the same process—a way of
relating to the world, whereby each element or particular of a whole is capable of reproducing or realizing the entirety of the whole. Thus mountains may take on a vast cosmic
reality by virtue of certain ritual or ascetic practices.19 The idea of a holographic basis to
Japanese religiosity is one developed by Thomas Kasulis in his work on Shinto (Kasulis
2004). Other scholars, however, many following the lead of Kuroda Toshio, have picked
up on this matter, which finds parallels in both exoteric and esoteric Buddhist traditions.20
Bernard Faure has written of the apparent absence of any clear referent to symbols used
within certain forms of Japanese Buddhism. In such cases, he suggests, symbols or objects
may simply be the reality that they “represent.” Another way to speak of this is to say that
the whole issue of idolatry that has plagued Western religions for millennia—whether the
golden calf, cross, or Ka’aba is a sign of the invisible transcendent force, a window giving
access to that force, or, heaven forbid, an idol21—is nonexistent in pre-modern and perhaps even in contemporary Japan (see Payne 2006: 246). Or to say, with Payne, that the
heavy use of symbols in esoteric Buddhism—and, if we follow Kuroda, in all forms of
Japanese religion—is not an indication of a dichotomy or separation between realms, but
an expression and assertion of the capability of the distinction between these realms—
what might be called the sacred and profane—to collapse.
Important here, again, is the power of ordinary material objects, as well as ritual acts
and words, to bring about the holographic transformation of realms.22 But perhaps even
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transformation is a misleading term, since what actually occurs is more often understood as
a recognition of the way things really are—rather than some sort of miraculous change of
state brought about by a god or sacred force. As Stone puts it, “Any sphere of phenomenal
activity could be ‘mandalized’ as a realm where the wisdom and compassion of the buddhas
and bodhisattvas were expressed” (2006: 45). Though the two realms may in fact be conceptually separated, they tend to conflate in practice, given the correct ritual conditions.
Moreover, the process can also occur to an individual, who commutes with a spiritual being,
provisionally taking on the identity and powers of such via ritual activity, austerities or meditation.23 Perhaps what we have here is something more akin to what is often called “magic”
rather than “religion”—though again we must not let the scholarly biases against the former
cloud our judgment, nor assume that the two realms can be so neatly separated.
A final point deserving attention here is the question of authenticity. Payne suggests
that the power of symbolic objects in Japan may lie precisely with their “capacity for infinite
reproduction or duplication.” Rather than search for authenticity, what is sought in a religious artefact is in fact multiplicity, understood as the capability of an ordinary object to take
on the powers of an original when distributed or, as is often the case in the modern Japanese
context, purchased. A visit to any popular religious festival or place of worship in Japan will
confirm the multifarious nature of Japanese religion—in that one will be surrounded by
booths selling all manner of objects and amulets whose purchase will impart some sort
of power via a holographic connection with the shrine or temple (see Payne 2006, 246).

Rituals of Realization
It has become commonplace in recent Buddhist Studies to lament the excessive attention
given to doctrine and philosophy, and by extension to the teachings of a small elite of
patriarchs and masters, to the neglect of the way religion is played out on the ground,
as it were, in folk beliefs, rituals, and community performances.24 The past several
decades have seen a redressing of this balance, as more studies are inclined towards social
scientific, and particularly anthropological, methods of approaching religion. This has
entailed an attempt on the part of some scholars to get a proper handle on how ritual can
be best conceived and applied in the study of Japanese religion. Yet even when scholars
have gotten past the more traditional Protestant or modernist disdain for ritual practice,
there still lingers a tendency to protect the sphere of ritual from the distortions of more
obviously secular forms such as economics and politics. This is especially problematic
when one deals with ancient Japan, where the two spheres were ineluctably interfused.
Even prior to the emergence of Buddhism as a protector of the state in the medieval
period, the word for government in Japan was matsurigoto 政—literally, “ritual or festival
matters.” By the Nara period if not earlier, the performance of ritual by the king had
become a way—perhaps the way—of establishing his (or her) power. In many respects
this mirrors early Chinese kingship patterns, a similarity likely not coincidental. At any
rate, the connection between religion and state power—and the use of ritual and ideology—as a discourse of legitimation is apparent throughout Japanese history, from the
17-Article Constitution (Kenpō jushichijō 憲法十七条, 605) to the Imperial Rescript
on Education (Kyōiku chokugo 教育勅語, 1890).
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Richard Payne (2006) has addressed this point in a wonderful reflection on what he
refers to as a “naturalized” conception of ritual. Payne makes the point that both economics and politics have long been considered as spheres apart from religion in general, and
the different aspects of religion in particular (2006: 243). Though Payne aims his critique
at Western scholars, it is fair to say the most contemporary Japanese scholars fall prey to
the same tendency. Payne is particularly keen to bring economics back into religion (244
n.16) for the simple reason that economics, in the micro if not macro sense of the term, is
fundamental to the way Japanese—and perhaps most religions—are actually practiced.
The key terms here would be obligation and reciprocity, which play a fundamental role
in Japanese cultural interactions as well as religious ritual. One might also add the term
‘faith’ here—understood not as it normally is in Western traditions as belief in the power
of unseen beings, as in the Japanese shinkō 信仰; but rather as shinyō 信用, which has a
rather more ‘secular’ and even economic meaning of “trusting in the integrity of social
relationships” and the efficacy of rules of conduct to bring about reciprocity25 (see
Fitzgerald 2003, 33). This ties directly into the element of worldly benefits (genze riyaku
現世利益), which some scholars (e.g., Reader and Tanabe 1998) have argued is in fact the
most prevalent trope of Japanese religiosity.26

Comparison
Let us look briefly at the way some other major non-Western religions approach or employ a
term equivalent to “religion.” Indian traditions, including both Hinduism and Buddhism,
have long employed the term dharma to signify the core of religion. A notoriously polyvalent
term, dharma is in one major sense strikingly similar to the Islamic din—that is, a path of
righteousness that comes from adhering to the teachings of the Vedas, or possibly the Upanishads, as well as to one’s caste duties. Yet dharma in Hinduism is more than just a path
to follow among many; it is also inscribed in the very fabric of the universe itself. Thus
dharma is sometimes described simply as Truth. Here, one might plausibly argue, the element
of faith is less important than in the Abrahamic traditions, by virtue of the fact that dharma is
simply the way things are, regardless of one’s particular beliefs. Yet, the way that Hinduism
came to be practiced by the vast majority of Indian people—i.e., via bhakti, personal devotion
to one or several gods; or darśana, viewing and being viewed by the divine—adherence to
dharma in Hinduism normally includes a devotional dimension.
In Indian Buddhism, dharma took on a slightly different nuance. While retaining its
connection to Truth as the way things really are, the term came to refer more specifically
to the Buddha’s teachings (in the Mahayana this was expanded to include the teachings of
all buddhas and bodhisattvas), and also was reframed in a somewhat more ethical fashion,
as reliance on a code of conduct rooted in compassion (karuna) rather than adherence to
social customs or family loyalties.

East Asian Connections
Having noted above some of the possibly distinctive features of Japanese religiosity in
relation to other major world religions, both Abrahamic and Indian, it is important to
address the question of whether, and to what extent, these features reflect influence from
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Japan’s giant neighbor, China. Is there a more particularly East Asian approach to or
understanding of religion that privileges praxis over belief? To a certain extent, I believe
there is. After all, one does not have to plunge too deeply into early Confucian writings to
discover an emphasis on ritual (li 禮), understood less as an activity done for the purpose
of relating to gods and spirits (whom, according to the Analects, one is supposed to
respect but keep at a distance), than as a form of practice or self-cultivation that manifests
within and helps shape social relations.27 Daoism, as well—at least in those forms emerging from the Daodejing and loosely labelled “philosophical” (daojia 道家)—seems to
privilege practical “way-making” over doctrine or even ritual and ethics as normally
understood.28
The influence of both these traditions on Japanese cultural and religious sensibilities is
beyond dispute, and thus it would not be surprising to find substantial overlap in matters
of religious practice. And yet, without capitulating to the sinophobic arguments of
Nativists such as Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) and Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843), there
are also substantial distinctions between Confucianism, which is primarily focused on
education and maintaining harmonious social relationships, Daoism, which tends towards
a goal of spontaneous and natural living in this world (or, in some forms of “religious
Daoism” [daojiao 道教] of immortality through the cultivation and manipulation of qi
氣 energy) and Japanese religions, which, as we have seen, place stronger emphasis on
the emotions as well as the element of homology/holography as noted above.

The Mahāyāna: Faith through Form
Though the cultural transmission of Buddhism through East Asia is a long, complex, and
only partly understood story, we can flesh out some key points in this transformation.
While the growth and development of the Mahāyāna and later Vajrayāna forms of
Buddhism seem to have deepened the element of faith and devotion within North and East
Asian Buddhism, deep contact with Sinitic culture and thought also infused some schools
of East Asian Buddhism—the Chan/Zen schools most particularly—with a decidedly
pragmatic flavor, one that fused with the growing devotional elements.29 The extrapolation of the concept of emptiness (śūnyāta) within the Mahāyāna schools also opened up
the possibility of a challenge to the traditional understanding of dharma as being solid and
eternal. After all, according to most understandings of emptiness, nothing is solid and
eternal—this is the only truth that one needs to realize.
And yet, rather than take one out of the mundane, this affirmation of emptiness flips
one back to the world of phenomenal reality, where the world is encountered in a direct,
concrete way, but always mediated by symbols and ritual practice. One finds the best
expression of this in the work of Japanese Sōtō Zen founder Dōgen 道元, who, though
often considered Japan’s greatest pre-modern philosopher, preached the ineluctable intertwining of Buddhist thought and practice. Indeed, practice for Dōgen remains the key to
enlightenment—one might even go so far as to say that enlightenment is nothing other
than correct practice.30 One does not achieve enlightenment—one does it.
The Pure Land schools, which together have been for some centuries now the largest
Buddhist sect in Japan, are often considered to be something of an anomaly within the
Mahāyāna or more particularly Japanese forms of Buddhism. The reason is that they
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appear to privilege devotion and absolute faith over the more pragmatic and ritually
oriented esoteric and Zen schools. In other words, they look suspiciously like religions
in the Western (or Hindu) sense. Yet even here looks can be deceiving. As James Dobbins
(1999: 166) has argued, the Pure Land sects offer a path to the deepest Mahāyāna truths
“through form, specifically mythic form.” Though Pure Land mythic form may not be so
immediately phenomenal as the mudrās, mantras, and mandalas of Shingon or the
ritualized everyday behaviors of Zen, the saving grace of Amida and the bodhisattvas
is normally made real through Pure Land art, sculpture and temple architecture—all of
which may act as transformation tableaux—and rituals, which become themselves “acts
of Amida” (281).
Most contemporary scholars would agree that, however significant certain ideas may
have been to the odd Buddhist master or Shinto scholar, it is orthopraxis and not
orthodoxy that drives and sustains Japanese religion. This is not to say that doctrine or
philosophy plays no role in shaping practice,31 but that it is normally the reactive rather
than the active partner in what Reader (2006: 71) refers to as a “creative dynamism”—
often mediated by liminal figures such as the wandering hijiri.32 Even in the unusual case
of traditional Buddhist sects or contemporary New Religions that claim exclusive commitment, that exclusivity is predicated on ritual and behavior more so than on doctrinal
adherence. In the case of the two largest Buddhist sects in Japan—the Shin and Zen
sects—which have traditionally admonished worshippers to avoid practicing superfluous
rituals beyond meditation (for Zen) and the nembutsu prayer (for Shin), scholars have
found a significant gap between the often strict rules proferred by the institution and the
way the traditions are practiced on the ground by the vast majority of followers.33 Indeed,
sectarian conflict in Japanese Buddhism tends to revolve around questions of the efficacy
of various ritual objects and techniques rather than disputes over doctrine.34 Given what
has been said above, however, regarding the radical phenomenality of Japanese religiosity, this should come as no surprise.

Whither the Secular?
Let me conclude with a few comments on a general issue that I think the study of Japanese
religions can help bring to light—namely, the vexed line between what is religious and
what is non-religious or secular.35 When religion is understood primarily in terms of faith,
doctrine, or institutional affiliation, the lines between religious and secular spheres, while
sometimes blurry, can be meaningfully sketched. When religion is understood in terms of
ritual practice, homology and holography, however, these sketched lines may well collapse. It is well-known that Japanese people today routinely disavow being “religious,”
only to make yearly visits to a shrine on New Year’s, actively participate in Obon festivals
for the dead, and so on. The disparity has less to do with cognitive dissonance than it does
with the way most Japanese people understand religion—i.e., the way most Westerners
do, as well as most scholars. If that’s religion, then I’m not religious.36 Most of the practices that are commonly performed by modern Japanese are rather considered to be “cultural” or “just being Japanese”—legacies, perhaps of the Meiji ideologies discussed
above.
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Of course, one danger of reframing religion in a performative, ritual sense, and
including within it the categories of economics and politics, is that it leads to such an
open-door policy that it becomes increasingly hard to say what is not religious in ordinary
Japanese behavior.37 After all, it is clear that reliance on gods, while a part of Japanese
Buddhist and Shinto doctrine, is not a fundamental feature of Japanese religiosity. The
activity is what makes the connection, fulfils obligation, or brings benefit or ‘salvation’38.
Yet this could apply to numerous situations normally considered ‘secular’; e.g., giving a
small gift after receiving a favor from someone (a ritual that even includes a formulaic
phrase insisting on the insignificance of said gift).

Conclusion
In short, at the heart of Japanese religiosity is ritual practice; practice framed as realization
or commutation rather than devotion as it is normally understood. Though such practice
on the ground is rarely connected to any specific doctrine, it is true that some general doctrinal understanding, such as that of “original” or “inherent enlightenment,” may provide
an important frame of reference for practice. Indeed, instead of obviating practice, the
notion that everything is always already in a higher or transformed state—the effective
collapsing of sacred and profane, secular and religious—allows practice to be understood
as an expression of connectedness rather than a means to connectedness.39 Or perhaps it is
both at once, another distinction here biting the dust. Richard Payne has argued for a new
approach to the study of ritual culture in Japan, one that frees itself from the bonds of
Western religious studies—in particular the assumption that “ritual derives from doctrine”—an assumption that he claims is not appropriate to the study of religion in Japan
(2006: 251).40 While this may be true, I would go further to ask whether the ready
assumption of the priority of doctrine to ritual—and, by extension, the understanding
of devotion as belief in a spirit or deity or adherence to certain propositions—is appropriate to the study of religion in any culture. It may be time to go beyond belief, and reconsider the significance of orthopraxis—especially in relation to the promise of worldly
benefits—in the world religions at large.41
Notes
1. As Hayashi (2006: 215) notes, prior to the Meiji resurrection of shūkyō, the words shūshi 宗旨
and shūmon 宗門 were frequently employed to mean something like “religion.” However, while
these earlier terms may not have been so obviously dependent on Western conceptions of religion, they too, like shūkyō, suffer from an intellectualist or institutionalist bias, implying something closer to sectarian teachings. Also see Isomae 2003, Shimazono and Tsuruoka 2004, and
Seki et al. 2003.
2. The related Arabic term iman, often literally translated “to learn,” in fact implies something more
like “to fully observe one’s faith”—indeed, the distinction between learning and faith virtually
collapses in the Quranic context. Russell McCutcheon has argued in several places (e.g., 2005:
38-40) that we should be wary about translating din with “religion,” pointing out that the term is
rooted less in something like “faith” than in social rules, debts and obligations—terms that strike
a chord with Japanese religiosity as discussed in this paper.
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3. Recognition of this disparity may go some ways towards explaining the relative lack of success
of Western religions in Japan. Even during the period from 1550-1650—Japan’s so-called
“Christian century”—when Japanese Christians numbered some 400 000, European missionaries had grave doubts about the extent to which these Japanese were “truly Christian”—which,
in their eyes, meant adhering strictly to Roman Catholic teachings. See Endo Shusaku’s Silence
for the best literary investigation of the tensions and paradoxes of Japanese Christianity. (Endo
1969; esp. 146-52)
4. Other terms such as mono, chi, mi and tama were also employed to refer to the natural powers
of the world (see Ito 1998). Since kami is the most well-known, it is the one I will focus on here,
but it should be kept in mind that these terms were likely used interchangeably.
5. Kuroda (1981) goes much further to suggest (albeit, without much evidence), that the very term
kami itself meant simply gods of any sort—initially Chinese Daoist deities—who were incorporated into Japanese religion at an early period. Thus Kuroda’s rather surprising conclusion
that Shinto in fact may have referred to Chinese (religious) Daoism.
6. See McFarland (1967: 24) for a list of seven different meanings of kami.
7. The Chinese Dao 道 is often conceived to be ‘beyond words’, as indicated by the cryptic opening lines of the Daodejing: 道可道也非恒道也; 名可名也非恒名也无. In terms of Shinto,
language has an extremely important role to play due to an ancient belief in kotodama 言霊
—the power of words to enact transformation.
8. See, e.g., Sasaki Shōten’s argument for understanding Japanese folk religiosity in terms of what
he calls an “animistic-shamanistic complex” categorized by a tension between kami that should
be approached with reverence and thanks (okagesama), and those that should be feared due to
their power to curse (tatari) (Sasaki 1988: 475).
9. See Reader and Tanabe (1998: 23) on the impossibility of separating the material from the spiritual in speaking of Japanese religions. Again, an oft-unquestioned category collapses rather
readily, to the extent that we should question our adherence to it at all.
10. Winston Davis includes kimochi along with shugyō 修行—which he translates as “religious
praxis” but which might be better translated as simply “austerities” or “cultivation”—as “the core
of Japanese religion” (Davis 1992: 236 [in Fitzgerald 2003]). Also see Hardacre (1986: 188) for a
discussion of self-cultivation as the core feature of Japanese New Religious Movements.
11. See Shimazono (1996: 227-28) for insightful comments on the resurgence of “animism” (or at
least the perception of Shinto as such) since the 1970s, a trend that the author connects with a
dual influence of Western New Age thinking and an anti-Western (or anti-materialist) construction of cultural identity. I believe that such factors have also greatly impacted the perception of
Zen for Westerners and Japanese alike.
12. Interestingly, the Latin root religio implied a sense of duty or reverence, and only derivatively
came to include the object that inspires such feelings. According to John Bossy, even in early
Christianity religio still referred primarily to a “worshipful attitude”—still a far cry from the
modern sense of a “system of doctrines and beliefs” (Bossy 1982: 4-5).
13. In Havens’s delightful expression of Kuroda’s thesis, Shinto is like an onion (rather than a
pearl), since “once relieved of its historical ‘accretions’, little remains of an immutable entity
worthy of the name ‘Shinto,’ at least until the creation of State Shinto in the modern period”
(Havens 2006: 18).
14. Kuroda 1981. See Bodiford (2006: 167) for a brief analysis of the main themes of kenmitsu
Buddhism.
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15. For one, Kuroda’s use of the secular-religious distinction in his critique is confusing at best,
problematic at worst. He also betrays an intellectualist bias in looking for a more accurate conception of the way terms such as Shinto and kami were conceptualized in the ancient period.
16. Stone (1999) has done much to deconstruct this assumption, but it remains prevalent in both
Japanese and Western scholarship. Stone and others such as Dobbins (1998) and Adolphson
(2000) have shown that the so-called “New Buddhisms” of the Kamakura period were not only
quite marginal movements initially, but they did not reject the “this worldly” approaches to
ritual of the prevailing Heian Buddhist consensus.
17. No doubt aware of the explanatory strength of his kenmitsu thesis, Kuroda concludes his most
famous essay on the matter with the suggestion that it gets to the subconscious essence of the
Japanese. This, to my mind, is to give the game away to the very scholars Kuroda opposes—
those who suggest an “essence” to Japanese religion to be found in (subconscious) Shinto. But
this may be simply a poor choice of terms.
18. See Ambros (2006: 293) for a discussion of homology in terms of shugendō or mountain asceticism. Also see Blacker 1965, Grapard 1982, Ten Grotenhuis 1999 and Keenan 1999 on the
process of “mandalization”—wherein mountains in particular serve as loci for a “realization”
of various realms of existence, from lowest to highest.
19. Perhaps the best term to describe this process is commutation. To commute within a spatial area
is at once to transform, to transfer, and to travel to that area. Yet it is important to remember that
there is little sense here of a change of essence—as in, say the Catholic transubstantiation of the
eucharist. Rather it is a change of form, but one capable of flipping back, due to the fact that
form is ultimately emptiness, and vice versa.
20. One thinks most obviously of the famous parable of Indra’s net from the Kegon (Skt.
Avatamsaka / Ch. Huayan) Sutra—a text whose influence extended well beyond the Kegon
school, despite its abstruseness. One might make the case that the eventual success of esoteric
Buddhism in Japan, and the kenmitsu complex, is due to the correlation between this
holographic approach and what already existed, albeit in a more rudimentary form, in what
Kasulis (2004) calls “existential Shinto.”
21. One might argue that a similar tension exists in Indian religions as well, particularly within
Buddhism, which has—perhaps especially in its southern or Theravāda forms—sometimes
struggled with the distinction between veneration of a Buddha image and devotion to such.
Again, however, it appears that the struggle was one felt much more by scholars and elites than
by the vast majority of practitioners. At any rate, any such tension virtually disappeared in the
Mahāyāna, with its much looser approach to devotion.
22. Cf. Jan van Bremen on understanding ritual as the process by which “trivial elements of the
social world can be elevated and transformed into symbols, categories, mechanisms, which,
in certain contexts, allow the generation of a special or extraordinary event” (Van Bremen and
Martinez 1995: 3) .
23. Pilgrimage is perhaps the most evident example of this process of commutation in Japanese
religion, both the popular Shikoku 88- temple henro 遍路 and the more ascetic kaihōgyō 回
峰行 of the Tendai monks of Mt. Hiei. Where pilgrims in the former may take on aspects of
Kōbō Daishi (Kūkai), those of the latter will become Fudō Myō-ō, the fierce guardian king.
A similar commutation may take place during misogi 禊 water austerities (see Payne 2006:
249). It is also important to include meditation here, especially given the fact that in Western
scholarship it is often if not always disassociated with ‘ritual’—and usually, at least in
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‘Protestant’ cultures, held above ritual as a less superstitious activity. See Payne (2006: 236 n.2)
on the irrelevance of this distinction (and value judgment) in the case of Japan.
See Schopen 1997 on material culture in Buddhism; Staal 1989 on ritual in Asian religions;
Payne 2006, Reader and Tanabe 1998, Averbuch 1995 and Law 1997 on the significance of
ritual culture and performance in Japan.
Obviously, herein lies the potential also for abuse of trust, particularly when it comes to aggressive techniques sometimes employed to sell amulets promising miracle cures—called reikan
shoho 霊感商法. Though the Religious Corporations Law attempts to regulate such abuses,
it is difficult, in a culture where commercial aspects of religion are not by any means considered
taboo or unusual, to draw clear distinctions between what is and is not legally or morally acceptable. For instance, Reader (2006) gives ample evidence of the commercial sale of pilgrimage
scrolls—whose prices can be exorbitant—and other items connected with the Shikoku 88-temple henro, items which always promise some sort of reward for oneself or one’s family in this
life of the next. The stamping of scrolls on the Shikoku pilgrimage is also evidence of the emergence of new rituals, whose origins can sometimes be surprisingly profane and/or mundane.
We might borrow Terry Eagleton’s critique of objective knowledge, applying the same critique
to ritual activity: “All of our [ritual actions] move within an often invisible network of valuecategories…. It is not just as though we have something called [ritual] which may then be distorted by particular interests and judgments… Interests [both ours and others] are constitutive of
our [ritual activity], not merely prejudices which imperil it.” In short, the objectivist appeal to a
form of ritual that is value free “is itself a value judgement” (Eagleton 1983, 194-95).
See, e.g., Analects 12:1—“The Master said: ‘Through mastering oneself and returning to ritual
(li) one becomes humane. If for a single day one can master oneself and return to ritual, the
whole world will return to humaneness (ren). Does the practice of humaneness come from oneself or from others?’ Yan Yuan said, ‘May I ask about the specifics of this?’ The Master said,
“Look at nothing contrary to ritual; do nothing contrary to ritual.’ Yan Yuan said, ‘Though unintelligent, Hui requests leave to put these words into practice.’” With regard to “spiritual beings,”
see Analects 6:20.
In their recent “philosophical translation” of the Daodejing, Roger Ames and David Hall argue
that the text and subsequent tradition are focused on extending ordinary awareness through
techniques of “habit-formation,” with the goal of “enchanting the everyday” and ultimately
“making life significant” (Ames and Hall 2003: 49-50). Ames and Hall go on to argue,
persuasively, I believe, that the classical Confucian worldview—based on li as “ritualized
awareness”—can be read in a very similar fashion, albeit with more direct emphasis on the family and social world.
Ama (1996) argues that the spread of Confucianism in Japan contributed to a this-worldly
emphasis and a decrease in concern with (Buddhist) conceptions of the afterlife. However, it
might alternatively be argued that “this worldliness”—or at least a concern with ritual efficacy
(see Matsumura 2006: 134)—is characteristic of “folk religion(s)” in general, and it was thus
the continuing influence of folk customs that played this role, which was then met on the other
end of the spectrum by Confucian doctrine filtering down from the scholars and elites. Also we
cannot rule out elements of “this worldiness” in Buddhism itself, especially in its Sino-Japanese
Mahāyāna forms.
See Maraldo 1981; Bielefeldt 1999: 220-22. Tanabe (1999: 18) notes that Dōgen’s rather
uncompromising sectarian views of correct Sōtō practice were quickly abandoned by his
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successors, including Keizan (瑩山 1264–1325), who, “displaying a pragmatism for what
works rather than what is doctrinally prescribed, easily adopted ritual practices that Dōgen
would not have considered”—a move that was crucial to the long term success of Sōtō Zen
as an institution. Also see Bodiford 1999 for a discussion of orthopraxis in Zen precept
procedures.
“Doctrine defines rituals and right conduct, but practice can also determine theory. And then
there are times when neither is the cause of the other, when one side, usually theory, is simply
ignored” (Tanabe 1999: 20).
A dynamism that, however creative, was not always harmonious (see Reader 2006). See Shinno
(1993: 197) for the role of the hijiri in mediating between universalizing and local traditions.
Also see Gardiner (1999: 154) on the flourishing of the Shingon 真言 sect due to elite support
and propagation of material culture.
See the writings of Sasaki Shōten for discussion of this problem via-à-vis Shin Buddhism, in
the context of his attempts to construct a “postmodern Shin theology” that fills the gap between
doctrine and practice (see Sasaki 1988). It would appear that Zen leaders have come to terms
with this, and essentially “given in” to the facts of Zen practice; i. e., that most Zen Buddhists
are simply not interested in meditation or philosophies of emptiness—or doctrine at all for that
matter—and are more concerned with ritual propriety, including, perhaps most importantly,
rituals and festivals surrounding the dead (see Reader 2006; Bodiford 2006: 171).
In much the same way that the sixth century disputes between the Soga 蘇我 and Mononobe 物
部氏 clans regarding the acceptance of the foreign religion of Buddhism were largely if not
entirely about ritual efficacy.
Here are some meanings of secular gleaned from the OED: 1. of or belonging to the world, as
opposed to the Church (used chiefly in a negative sense); 2. of or belonging to the common people; 3. of or belonging to the present or visible world as opposed to the eternal or spiritual world;
4. in scientific use, an enormously long period of change. Given the tropes of Japanese religiosity,
these distinctions melt away, effectively hollowing out the term along with its opposite. The Japanese term for “secular”—sezoku 世俗—implies only the second of the above four English senses,
thus closer to the English “common” or “vulgar” than to “non-religious.” See Fitzgerald (2003: 6)
for an extended (and not unproblematic) critique of the use of terms religious and secular within
the study of religion; also see Van Bremen and Martinez 1995: 2-3).
See Kisala 2006: 3: “In contrast to the situation in many of the European countries and some
other areas of the West, where we see relatively high levels of at least nominal religious affiliation and low levels of participation in religious rites, religion in Japan is marked by almost universal participation in certain rites and customs but low levels of self-acknowledged affiliation
to a religious group.”
Of course, not all scholars would lament the collapse of these categories. Fitzgerald argues for
just such an open-door policy on the study of Japanese ritual, suggesting that distinctions such
as “belief in superhuman agents” are only “weakly conceptualized” in Japan. “Indeed,” he concludes, “it may be that the Japanese capacity to take the shrine and temple performance of
rituals seriously in the absence of clearly articulated ideas or doctrines…can only in principle
be understood in the context of the whole spectrum of ritual performances that are conducted in
every institution and at every level of society” (Fitzgerald 2003: 9-10; italics in original).
“Salvation” is another ambiguous term in the Japanese context. The best translation, kyūsai 救
済, includes not only spiritual salvation by deities but also, and perhaps more significantly, any
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form of worldly help one may receive in time of need (cf. The more common tasukeru 助ける).
Whereas there is some truth in Dykstra’s (1999: 117) comment to the effect that Buddhism in
Japan has been used as a means of “acquiring mundane benefits as well as spiritual salvation,”
the distinction itself may be inappropriate.
39. See Tanabe 1999: 10-11; Reader 2006: 105.
40. Also see Bachnik 1995: 109-110; Fitzgerald 2003: 9.
41. See Ikegami 2004 for a preliminary attempt to extend the analysis of “worldly benefits” beyond
Japanese or Asian religions.
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